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ABSTRACT: Panel data models are estimated to highlight the income-gap as a driver of individual de-
cisions to migrate. This procedure allows to testing the hypothesis that the per capita income-gap of rural 
spaces along with the employment rate and aging explain the fall in the population of rural villages and 
the concentration of population in functional urban areas (FUA). First, using panel data models, the links 
between rural depopulation and the income-gap are estimated with data at the municipal level. Second, 
the effects of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) on the convergence of income levels 
for rural inhabitants are evaluated.
Despoblación rural y convergencia en renta
RESUMEN: Estimamos unos modelos de datos de panel para ilustrar cómo la brecha de ingresos impulsa 
las decisiones individuales de emigrar y los usamos para contrastar la hipótesis de que la brecha de renta 
per cápita, junto con las tasas de empleo y de envejecimiento, explican la despoblación rural y la concen-
tración de la población en las áreas funcionales urbanas (AFU). Estimamos modelos a nivel municipal para 
cuantificar la relación entre brecha de renta y despoblación. Seguidamente, estudiamos los efectos de los 
Fondos Europeos Estructurales y de Inversión para favorecer la convergencia del mundo rural.
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1. Introduction
The objective of the paper is, first, to identify empirically the links between rural 
depopulation and the income-gap using the available data at the municipal level. 
Second, to study the effects of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) 
on the catching-up of rural population income. Economic models of migration point 
to the search for higher incomes as the primary driver behind individual decisions on 
interregional migrations (Borjas, 1989). 
Our hypothesis is that the critical variable for explaining the fall in population 
density in rural areas is the per capita income-gap with urban areas located in the 
most dynamic regions. In other words, the population tends to move to areas with 
higher incomes and to concentrate in urban cores and their surrounding metropolitan 
areas that Eurostat designates as Functional Urban Areas (FUA). 
With this aim, we first develop models where the income-gap appears as a driver 
for rural depopulation. Then, in the second part, we extend the model and seek to 
evaluate the effects of ESIFs in Spain for the period 2000-2013. Given that the funds 
provided explicitly target the reduction of economic disparities among regions, we 
expect that in the case in which they are correctly allocated, they could improve in-
come in rural areas and ultimately prevent their depopulation.
The primary added value of this research is that it allows comparison of the re-
sults in terms of convergence of two budgetary periods covering different phases of 
the economic cycle and two ESIF operational programs1. As explained below, our 
results, using data from funds that were actually spent, show that the effects on the 
real convergence of the regions were different after the recession that took place from 
2007-13 (FEGA, 2017a and 2017b).
As our objective is to study rural depopulation, the first step is to establish a de-
finition of a rural area. Population, size and density are the most traditionally used 
indicators to identify rural areas. Moreover, new labels, as mentioned above, have 
appeared such as FUA, developed in the European project Urban Audit to collect 
statistical information to compare the quality of life of leading European cities. One 
result of interest from our work is that this new classification allows us to prove that 
the highest income density per dwelling is also concentrated in the main FUA in 
Spain (European Commission, 2004 and 2016). Moreover, the lowest average unem-
ployment rates are currently located in the main cities or nearby in their FUA. (INE, 
2019; data for 2016). 
In summary, the most recent data show the usefulness of identifying the causal 
elements of rural depopulation and going beyond the traditional indicators of rural 
depopulation. At any rate, to work with comparable data at the municipality level, in 
the present paper we assume the legal definition of a rural municipality, which are 
towns having fewer than 30,000 inhabitants and a population density lower than 100 
inhabitants per square kilometer. Additionally, we excluded municipalities in any of 
the 150 FUAs.
1 We use the available data for the period 2000-06 and 2007-13.
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2. Data 
The importance of data quality is fundamental (Pienkowski & Berkowitz, 2015). 
One of the main reasons why evaluations of the effectiveness of ESIFs present such 
disparate results is the quality and source of the data used. A large part of these stu-
dies has used data on budgeted expenditure (Becker et al., 2012a and 2012b, among 
others), ignoring the long lags that exist – even more than three years - between the 
scheduled spending date and the actual effective spending. Attempts to compensate 
for this lag have been done with the use of lags in the regressions (Rodriguez-Pose & 
Fratesi, 2003), obtaining significant results. However, the use of appropriate data, if 
granted access, is always recommended. Unfortunately, and despite efforts to build 
databases at the community level (e.g. ESPON and SWECO), the regional nature of 
the management of these funds and a lack of coordination on the part of the relevant 
authorities make it a challenge to gather data that maintains a high disaggregation 
level in the details of budget execution dates.
Fortunately for this study, the Spanish General Management Subdirectorate of the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) provided us with access to the execu-
ted ERDF and Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) expenditures for 
the operational programs 2000-2006 and 2007-2013, which together account for appro-
ximately 75 % of the total amount of the ESIF. On the other hand, the program expen-
ses for all the ESIFs have been obtained from the operational programs of each region.
The data on real GDP (base 2010), the GDP deflator and the population resident 
in Spain come from the Spanish Foundation for Applied Economic Research FEDEA 
database (FEDEA, 2019). Public investment and the calculation of human capital (as 
a weighted average of years aimed at studying the population between the ages of 15 
and 64) come from the database created by the IVIE2; the employment rate comes 
from EUROSTAT. The public debt of the regions (NUT-2) comes from the website 
of the Spanish Ministry of Finance; the contribution to the GDP of agriculture comes 
from the INE. The government quality index, following Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo 
(2013), has been obtained by merging data from the database of the University of 
Gothenburg and the World Bank Governance Data.
Below we abstract the primary sources of data on rural population used in our 
models.
1) Income and Gini variables: From the FEDEA database (Personal income of 
Spanish municipalities and their distribution, years 2004 to 2006 and 2007 
update). (FEDEA, 2019).
FEDEA data from the AEAT (Spanish Tax Administration Agency) income 
tax by municipality that exclude Navarra and the Basque Country because 
they have an autonomous fiscal administration.
Regarding the latter source, it is essential to point out that for privacy issues, 
the database is built with municipalities that have more than 5,000 inhabitants.
2 IVIE: Valencian Institute of Economic Research (https://www.ivie.es/en_US/).
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2) Data on the population by a municipality (men and women, population by 
age, foreign population (INE, 2019)). 
3) Employment: IVIE database (IVIE, 2019): 
All data are at the municipal level, except for employment. Working popula-
tion data are not available by municipalities, but as it is a crucial variable for 
explaining the depopulation, it was necessary to use the working population 
of the region as a proxy in the model. 
During the real estate boom the employment expanded in certain rural areas. 
As the construction sector is highly masculinized, we introduced MALE, the 
proportion of males in the working population, as a control variable attemp-
ting to control for municipalities with expansion in the construction sector.
3. Methodology and literature review
Approximately one-third of the EU budget is allocated to the ESIFs, which, after 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), represent the second largest community po-
licy. Due to the enormous size of these funds and their macroeconomic importance, 
several studies have investigated their impact on interregional convergence in Europe 
(see, among others, Ederveen et al., 2002; 2006; Rodríguez-Pose & Fratesi, 2002, 
2004; Puigcerver-Peñalver, 2007; Becker et al., 2008; 2010, 2012a and 2012b; Boscá 
et al., 2016).
However, the empirical results on the effectiveness of the ESIF to achieve real 
convergence are striking according to the period under analysis. Recent work indi-
cates that in the period 1995-2010 there was an “existence of a regressive process in 
terms of regional convergence” (Rodil et al., 2014; p. 300).
In the Díaz & Franjo (2016) model, as in the case of the building sector’s boom 
in Spain, the low interest rates in the Eurozone during the expansion before the real 
estate crisis constrained the growth of the economy’s TFP (total factor productivity) 
by inefficiently allocating a disproportionate share of the investments. The concen-
tration during the economic boom of investments in not internationally tradable 
goods and services (e.g., real estate) generated the subsequent massive loss of em-
ployment in the construction sector in regions lagging behind during the recession, 
affecting convergence in per capita GDP. The latter may have had relevant effects in 
the working population changes in rural areas, mainly during the construction sector 
expansion and a sharp recession later on. In the following section, we present the 
models that relate the rate of variation of the population in the rural areas with the 
income-gap, employment, and the aging population. The objective is to exploit the 
municipal microdata of the declared income in the income tax database of FEDEA at 
the highest level of disaggregation.
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4. Models of rural depopulation
In this section, we relate the rural depopulation rate with the taxpayers’ income-
gap. We test the hypothesis that the per capita income-gap (together with working 
population and aging) is a driver of the speed of depopulation. Income-gap is calcula-
ted as the distance in per capita income between rural and urban municipalities. Our 
empirical analysis uses a specification as follows:
[1]
Where gi,t is the growth rate of the population calculated as , p de-
notes population, with i and t as municipality and time index, respectively; yi,t is the 
variable of interest, described in the following paragraph; Xi,t is a matrix of municipal 
characteristics that include employment growth (provincial working population), 
foreign population, aging index, masculinity index and Gini index; φi y τt are vectors 
of invariant municipal characteristics and dichotomous time variables that capture 
permanent differences in population growth rates, respectively; finally, εi,t is a vector 
of i.i.d. residual.
Four models were estimated, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. In the first column, 
yi,t is per capita income; in the second column, yi,t is the year-on-year growth of per 
capita income; in the third column, yi,t is the per capita income-gap, calculated as the 
difference between the average per capita income in each province that has never 
been Objective 1 (Objective Convergence in the current operational program) and the 
average income in municipality i; finally, in the fourth column, yi,t(lag) is the year-
on-year growth of the income-gap.
In Tables 1 and 2 the same models were estimated but with the introduction of 
lags in yi,t, in order to capture the impact of those decisions with greater precision. 
Besides this, in the two tables, both control variables, the masculinity index and the 
employment growth, are always positive. The first arguably indicates that the growth 
of employment in the highly masculinized sector (construction) has an essential im-
pact on population growth. The second one suggests that higher levels of provincial 
activity contribute to maintain municipalities’ population in the same province since 
the inhabitants do not need to emigrate because they are close enough to their jobs or 
may commute.
In Table 1, when we consider all the rural municipalities and the municipalities of 
the Objective 1 regions, respectively, we obtain very similar results for our variables 
of interest. However, in Table 2, when we only consider rural municipalities, the 
variables of interest, especially the lagged growth rates (columns 2 and 4), increase 
their absolute value considerably, indicating that the impact on migration of having 
lower income or observing growth in the income distance with respect other munici-
palities increases considerably after one year.
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Regarding the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) 
some regions (Andalusia, the Canary Islands, Valencia, and Murcia) have received 
less aid per capita than the national average. The foregoing could be due to two fac-
tors:
• When considering only the expenditure executed, this may have been delayed 
in the regions mentioned above, which would overlap with the first payments 
of the next programming period.
• The EAFRD may be of a less redistributive nature than the ERDF since to 
promote the convergence of rural areas, regions that are not Objective 1 but 
where agriculture is of great importance, such as Aragón, Navarra, and Rioja, 
have received more aid than the national average. 
5. The increase in the differences in the working population between regions: 
σ Convergence 
The speed of convergence and whether it is transitory or permanent in nature 
plays an essential role in characterizing regional disparities in income and, hence, 
has important implications for the design of agricultural policy. We say that there is 
β-convergence if regions with lower levels of per capita income tend to grow faster 
than the income leaders, and σ-convergence if the dispersion of their relative per ca-
pita income levels tends to decrease over time.
It follows that β-convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
σ-convergence. An important implication of this result is that income inequality 
across countries or regions may persist due to shocks (e.g., cyclical fluctuations in 
economic activity) that tend to increase dispersion. 
After disaggregating per capita GDP into two components, income per worker Y/L 
and percentage of working population (L/n) we observe that although the standard 
deviation of income per worker has remained constant throughout the period, the 
standard deviation of the percentage of the employed population increased since 2007.
Y/n = Y/L * L/n [2]
The latter indicates that the main engine of divergence for the second sub-period 
has been the increase in the differences in the working population between regions. 
Employment and depopulation are co-related in the rural areas, so divergence in in-
come per capita regarding the urban areas may decrease the working population in 
rural areas. This leads us to study the conditional convergence of the regions.
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.
β Convergence
A second step in understanding the problem is the analysis of the β convergence. 
To do this in Table 3 Beta convergence and beta conditional convergence, using 
cross-section data the following regressions have been estimated:
git = α + β * ln(yi,t-1) + uit [3]
git = α + β * ln(yi,t-1) + σ*kh + uit [4]
where git represents the average per capita GDP growth rate in the period stu-
died, yi,t-1 per capita GDP at the beginning of the period and kh human capital. We 
introduce the human capital because it is usually affected by the rural brain drain of 
metropolitan regions, cities and greater cities.
While git = α + β*ln(yi,t-1)+ uit [3] estimates absolute β convergence, since git = α 
+ β*ln( yi,t-1)+ σ*kh + uit [4] assumes that each region has its own stationary state, and 
therefore, by including human capital it is about capturing significant and exclusive 
characteristics of each region to find the conditional β convergence. Our results con-
firm the hypothesis that regional convergence stopped after the financial crisis and, 
during the fiscal austerity period, has reverted to divergence (see Table 3 Beta con-
vergence and beta conditional convergence).
In the period from 2000 to 2007, a conditional convergence process of up to 
6.44 % is observed, while from 2008 to 2013, the β coefficient not only changed its 
sign but also ceased to be significant and R2 fell from 0.68 to 0.13. It can be con-
cluded, therefore, that the 2008 financial crisis negatively affected Spanish regional 
convergence.
6. Empirical Results: Spanish regional convergence
In this section we attempt to answer the following question: Do ESIFs have a 
significant impact on Spanish regional convergence in terms of per capita income?
We also observe how the initial per capita GDP level negatively affects growth, 
which confirms that conditional β convergence has occurred. Specifically, 1 % more 
in the per capita GDP leads to growth rates that are approximately 0.4 % lower. In 
general terms, the regressions have an R2 greater than 50 %. In addition, the F statis-
tic is close to 20, so the variables used can explain changes in per capita GDP growth 
(Table 4).
Focusing on the ESIFs, we find that both the ERDF expenditure executed and the 
budgeted expenditure of the funds as a whole have a weakly positive but significant 
effect. These results are consistent with those offered by Rodríguez-Pose & Fratesi, 
(2002, 2004) and Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo (2013), which also conclude that the 
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funds have an effect in the short term but not in the long run. The latter would mean 
that the funds have a purely redistributive effect, not a structural one. These findings 
agree with Becker et al. (2010) who also find that the impact of the funds disappear 
when certain regions of the United Kingdom stop receiving them. But our latest 
investigation using data for Member States regions allowed identifying permanent 
effects.
Next, we extend the model to observe if there are spillover effects of the ESIF, 
in particular of the ERDF, from the receiving region to other border regions. In fact, 
in Table 3 (estimation of the spillover model and public debt), when interacting this 
variable with the ERDF variable, the result is a positive and significant coefficient, 
which implies that a percentage of the aid to the regions Objective 1 ends up having 
positive effects in other regions.
We also study whether the level of indebtedness in the region, measured as 
the percentage of public debt to GDP, has some impact on the ability to attract 
investments through projects co-financed by ESIFs in the region.
[5]
The coefficient turns out to be negative and significant, so we conclude that the 
impact of ESIFs on regional growth is no longer linear and will depend negatively on 
the degree of public debt held by the Autonomous Regions (Table 5).
This result is robust and matches those of previous studies (Georgescu, 2008; 
Varga, 2010; Varga & In’t Veld, 2011; Esposti & Bussoleti, 2008). Also, its rele-
vance increases due to the crisis, since cuts in public spending have created difficul-
ties when absorbing ESIFs, causing a significant number of them not to be executed 
in the foreseen date and, therefore, limiting their ability to boost the regional eco-
nomy (Marzinotto, 2011).
In Table 6, we present the two models to account for the impact of the crisis on 
growth explicitly, and that is why we include it as an artificial variable “crisis” in the 
model, taking values of one for dates after 2007 and null for previous years. Effec-
tively the estimated models go from an R2 of 0.54 to 0.72 increasing, in turn, the F 
(41.4 and 45.7). From this result, we infer that in the previous model, we were igno-
ring something fundamental like the change in the economic cycle and that more con-
sistent estimates yield better empirical results. The first model (Table 6 in columns 2 
and 3) draws attention is the decrease in the rate of β convergence, passing from a co-
efficient of -0.41 to another of -0.17. As we already prove that the income per capita 
divergence is a driver of the rural depopulation, the latter means that crisis would ac-
celerate the concentration of population in urban areas with relatively higher income. 
Besides, regarding our variables of interest, all have ceased to be significant, 
which would imply a sharp decrease of impact on economic growth by European 
funds during the recession.
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In the second model (Table 6 in columns 4 and 5), we present the results for the 
interaction of the “crisis” variable with the European rural development funds. The 
coefficient is negative and significant for “crisis * ERDF,” indicating the negative 
impact of the recession in the potential of foster growth of the rally executed projects 
(ERDF). 
But in the interaction of programmed funds with the crisis (crisis * program), 
the coefficient turns out to be not significant in both models. On the other hand, the 
coefficient relative to the ERDF becomes slightly negative (-0.04) and meaningful. 
The latter implies an insignificant contribution to growth, which we suspect may be 
related to the worsening of the functioning of the regional public administration due, 
among other factors, to the budgetary restriction. As it seems plausible to think that 
since the projects are co-financed, by the principle of additionality, through Euro-
pean and national or regional funds, the reduction of public spending to which the 
Spanish economy has been forced was a relevant factor in hindering the execution 
of funds budgeted.
The delay in the execution of the projects amounts up to 8,153 million. That 
means the 31.7 % of the planned expenditure (Program) in the case of the ERDF for 
the period 2007-2013. Approximately 10 % more than in the period 2000-2006. In 
this way, both variables “crisis” and public debt (“Debt” in Table 5) seem to have 
harmed the effectiveness of European funds.
7. Conclusions
The main drivers of rural population’s evolution are the income-gap with urban 
areas, the working population rate of growth, and the aging rate in rural areas. 
Urban areas, especially when functional urban areas are included in the data, 
show a trend toward income concentration, not only because FUA concentrates 
population and activity, but also because over average income taxpayer density is 
higher in functional urban areas than in rural areas. Intermediate areas increase their 
weight in relation to the total population mainly by ex-urbanization as well as resi-
dential developments and the clustering of industrial as well as commercial areas.
Within regions, at the municipal level, population decreases in villages and 
towns with fewer than 30,000 inhabitants in general. Moreover, certain towns con-
centrate activity such as district centers or become incorporated into nearby functio-
nal urban areas.
The economic recession after the 2008 financial crisis halted the income conver-
gence between regions. That meant the end of the real income convergence process 
operating during the pre-recession period. According to our results, the effects of the 
European Structural and Investment Funds may change depending on the period of 
study. Possibly budgetary austerity have had a specific role in those results. 
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Convergence in income appears as a relevant driver against rural depopulation, 
and the ESIF appears as one of the leading public investment programs. Especially in 
lagging regions, the convergence process may have slowed down rural depopulation. 
This article estimated the impact of the structural funds on the convergence in per 
capita GDP between Autonomous Communities, and we have attempted to quantify 
the effect of the variables that can significantly influence the current rhythm of regio-
nal convergence in Spain.
The empirical results show that the convergence process in the study period, 
2000-2013, is divided symmetrically into two sub-periods: 2000-07 and 2008-13. 
While in the first interregional differences decreased, in the second, during the down-
turn, they increased.
In the period 2000-13, without considering the crisis, the model using the data of 
both the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) executed and that of the set 
of budgeted structural funds (not actually implemented investment) seems to detect a 
weak impact of these projects on growth. However, by including the delayed effects 
on investment time, this impact disappears after one year, with the result of redistri-
buting income becoming more apparent.
When we control for the recession, the estimates change substantially (See Table 
6: Estimation of the model with the artificial variable crisis included). The rate of 
convergence and the impact of the ERDF on growth turn out to be slightly negative, 
and the impact of the budgeted funds as a whole is not significant. In addition, we ve-
rify the importance of other factors generally ignored in the literature, such as regio-
nal public debt and spillovers. The level of indebtedness in the region has a definite 
adverse effect on the effectiveness of European projects. Additionally, we identified 
a clear spillover effect from the funds towards other border regions on those that are 
formally receiving.
Therefore, our analysis suggests that structural funds function more as a redis-
tributive policy than as a structural policy, as other authors have also suggested 
(Boldrin & Canova, 2001). This means moving away from its primary objective: To 
contribute to the long-term creation of a socially and economically cohesive Europe.
On the other hand, changes in economic cycles seem to have a significant impact 
on the ability of funds to contribute to the growth of the regional economies. There-
fore, it is essential to be able to adapt the funds according to the phase of the business 
cycle, especially during downturns, to ensure their effectiveness. The anti-crisis fund 
budgeted in the draft budget perspectives for the Multi-annual EU budget 2021-27 
could fulfill this function as long as it reaches a sufficient volume to have signifi-
cant effects. Given that the Eurozone suffered a liquidity trap that lasted three years, 
an expansion of central government spending in the euro area equal to 1 % of the 
Eurozone’s GDP could increase GDP in the periphery by more than 1 % (Blanchard 
et al., 2017).
The hypothesis that the per capita income-gap of rural spaces is fueling depopu-
lation has been tested, but working opportunities and aging shows as even more rele-
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vant drivers. The role of the ESIF to promote convergence has been different during 
the expansion than in the downturn.
Notably in Spain, the crisis has asymmetrically hit regions, hindering conver-
gence. Thus, the regions with the most significant public debt problems, which are 
usually Objective 1, are the ones that have had the most difficulties in adjusting to 
the budgetary austerity program. In addition, reductions in public spending have had 
a significant adverse effect. 
It is money that was not invested since the project was not applied for due to the 
lack of available budget to co-finance it. This also implies, according to the European 
Union principle of additionality, that part of the ESIF funds were not allocated at the 
critical moment of the great recession. 
As a consequence, the potential effectiveness of ESIFs to boost real convergence 
is severely weakened. As Bonatti & Fracasso (2017; p. 35-36) point out, part of the 
problems of the peripheral regions are structural, and this should be the objective of 
the ESIF: Solving the structural issues. However, during the recession, the backward 
regions have also suffered the consequences of European austerity policies, so they 
could also recover lost ground in real convergence if there were a fiscal expansion in 
the future. The latter is consistent with the position of Blanchard et al. (2013, 2017), 
who maintain that the multiplier of public spending grows during recessions, and 
who also underscore how the liquidity trap in the periphery of the Eurozone could 
improve the effectiveness of an external fiscal stimulus.
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Appendix 
TABLE 1




1 2 3 4









* (-0.02) 0.047* (-0.02) 0.047* (-0.02) 0.047* (-0.02)
Foreigners -0.194** (-0.07) -0.194** (-0.07) -0.194** (-0.07) -0.194** (-0.07)
Old -1.367*** (-0.21) -1.367*** (-0.21) -1.367*** (-0.21) -1.368*** (-0.21)
Male 0.425*** (-0.09) 0.425*** (-0.09) 0.425*** (-0.09) 0.425*** (-0.09)
Gini -0.021** (-0.01) -0.021** (-0.01) -0.021** (-0.01) -0.021** (-0.01)
Constant -0.159 (-0.11) -0.159 (-0.11) -0.159 (-0.11) -0.159 (-0.11)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects 
(municipalities) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cross-sections 




2,418 1,612 2,418 1,612
Source: Own elaboration.
Note 1: Estimates uses a specification as follows: 
[1]
Where gi,t is the growth rate of the population , were the subindex of g are: i for population and t as time index, 
respectively; yi,t is the variable of interest, described in the following paragraph; Xi,t is a matrix of municipal cha-
racteristics that include employment growth (provincial working population), Foreigners, foreign population; 
Old, ageing index; Male, masculinity index as a proxy for construction intensity; Gini, the Gini per capita index 
of the municipality; φi y τt  are vectors of invariant municipal characteristics and dichotomous time variables that 
capture permanent differences in population growth rates, respectively; finally, εi,t is a vector of i.i.d. residual.
In the first column, yi,t is per capita income; in the second, yi,t is the year-on-year growth of per capita income; 
in the third, yi,t is the per capita income-gap, calculated as the difference between the per capita income means 
of each province that has never been Objective 1 and the average income of the municipality i; finally, in the 
fourth column, yi,t (lag) is the year-on-year growth of the income-gap. In Table 1, we consider all the Spanish 
rural municipalities and the municipalities of the Objective 1 regions, respectively, and we obtain very similar 
results for our variables of interest.
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TABLE 2




1 2 3 4
Av. Income (lag) 1.2*10-9*** (0.00)
Av. Income growth (lag) 6.7*10-5*** (0.00)
Gap (lag) -1.4*10-9*** (0.00)




*** (-0.02) 0.051** (-0.02) 0.073*** (-0.02) 0.051** (-0.02)
Foreigners -0.173** (-0.06) 0.446*** (-0.09) -0.173** (-0.06) 0.446*** (-0.09)
Old -1.358*** (-0.19) -0.806** (-0.3) -1.358*** (-0.19) -0.807** (-0.3)
Male 0.387*** (-0.08) 0.500*** (-0.08) 0.387*** (-0.08) 0.500*** (-0.08)
Gini -0.021** (-0.01) -0.040*** (-0.01) -0.021** (-0.01) -0.040*** (-0.01)
Constant -0.13 (-0.09) -0.381*** (-0.1) -0.13 (-0.09) -0.381*** (-0.1)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects (mu-
nicipalities) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cross-sections 




1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120
Data source: FEDEA fiscal micro data by municipalities for the pre-crisis years.
Source: Own elaboration.
Note 2: The estimates here use Equation 1, using similar models as in Table 1, but all the variables of interest 
are lagged, and municipalities data refers to the pre-crisis period only, seeking to identify retarded effects on de-
population paths. Now the variables of interest, especially the delays in growth rates (columns 2 and 4), increase 
their absolute value considerably, indicating that the impact on migration of having lower incomes or observing 
a growth in the income differential with other municipalities it increases considerably after one year.
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TABLE 3
Beta convergence and beta conditional convergence
 
 
β convergence (absolute) β convergence (conditional)
2000-2013 2000-2007 2008-2013 2000-2013 2000-2007 2008-2013
gi,t -1.37 (0.79) -2.56 (-0.89) 0.902 (1.31) -4.11 (-3.91) -6.44 (-5.38) 2.08 (1.13)
kh 1.2 (3.09) 1.76 (3.83) -0.41 (0.7)
R2 0.2 0.35 0.1 0.52 0.68 0.13
Source: Own elaboration.
Note 3: A second step to understand the problem of depopulation of rural areas is to analyse the β convergence. 
Table 3 present’s the estimated β coefficient for the Spanish regions, on the years 2000-2013, 2000-2007 and 
2008-2013, using cross-section data, for the following regressions:
git = α + β * ln(yi,t-1) + uit [3] β convergence (absolute) in columns 2, 3 and 4
git = α + β * ln(yi,t-1) + σ*kh + uit [4] β convergence (conditional) in columns 5, 6 and 7
where: git represents the average per capita GDP growth rate in the period studied, yi,t-1 per capita GDP at the 
beginning of the period and kh human capital in Equation 4 the human capital ratio of region. 
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TABLE 4
Estimation of the model by fixed effects and with the inclusion of time delays
 
Current year Lag1 Lag2 Lag3
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
GDP pc -0.410 -7.91 -0.437 -8.12 -0.403 -7.31 -0.386 -7.25
ERDF 0.016  2.54 -0.008 -1.35 -0.003 -0.53 0.004 0.73
EAFRD 0.003 1.35 -0.002 -0.80 -0.004 -1.66 -0.001 -0.69
Program 0.016 3.76 0.017 1.98 0.009 1.09 -0.007 -0.86
Kh 0.028 2.88 0.023 3.11 0.024 3.12 0.0249 3.26
Ip 0.0341 3.34 0.050 3.36 0.055 3.69 0.057 3.91
Employ 0.120 2.62 0.115 2.49 0.108 2.32 0.112 2.42
n + g + δ -0.024  -1.35 -0.028 -1.66 -0.023 -1.29 -0.032 -1.76
Agr 0.004 0.27 0.003 0.37 0.006 0.67 0.008 0.96
Constant 5.076 8.14 5.475 8.62 5.099 7.83 4.867 7.74
 R2 within 0.54  0.51  0.51  0.51  
F 20.90  18.64  18.03  18.24  
Observations n.º 237  237  236  235  
Groups n.º 17  17  17  17  
Average 
observations 13.9  13.9  13.9  13.9  
Source: Own elaboration.
Note 4: The dependent variable is the regional income per capita growth. The instant impact on growth of the 
income per capita of the region in the (current year) and the delayed effects of the investments in the next year 
(Lag1), after two years (Lag2) and three years later (Lag3) coefficients estimated and t-values are presented in 
table 4 from left to right columns.
The income per capita growth variation, GDP pc, is explained as a function of the executed investment’s pro-
jects co-financed by the European Rural Development Fund, ERDF and the and the European Agricultural Fund 
for Rural Development, EAFRD. Program is the variable for the budgeted Structural Projects (that may be 
executed or not in practice).
To them, we add in both models the following control variables: kh the human capital; ip the rate of public in-
vestment over the GDP; Employ, the working population rate of the region; the sum of n (population growth), 
g and δ, where g is the technological progress and δ the capital depreciation rate; agr, rate of the agricultural 
production in the region’s GDP.
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TABLE 5
Estimation of the spillover model and public debt
Dependent Variable : ln (growth GDP pc)
Independent Variables Coefficient t Coefficient t
GDP pc -0.473 -8.99 -0.407 -7.50
ERDF 0.005 1.42 0.007 2.65
Kh 0.029 3.89 0.029 3.17
Ip 0.042 2.98 0.049 3.47
Employ 0.150 3.42 0.079 1.65
n + g + δ -0.023 -1.37 -0.021 -1.20
agr 0.0005 0.07 .009 1.02
Spillover 0.095 1.35  
Spillover*ERDF 0.041 2.97  
Debt   0.244 1.97
Debt *Funds   -0.061 -2.39
Constant 5.97 9.60 5.07 8.20
R2 within 0.54 0.52
F 22.94 20.73
N.º observations 237 237
N.º groups 17 17
Average observations 13.9 13.9
Source: Own elaboration.
Note 5: The income per capita growth variation, GDP pc, is explained as a function of the executed investment’s 
projects co-financed by the European Rural Development Fund, ERDF. The empirical results of the two panel 
data model estimates using fix effects are shown. For the first model (in columns 2 and 3) including the fo-
llowing control variables: spillover, growth on the border region neighbuors of Objective 1 regions; spillover * 
ERDF, the interaction of the spillovers with the executed ERDF projects; 
In the second model (columns 4 and 5), with similar specification, we include the variable Debt, the public debt 
ratio over the region’s GDP; and the interaction (Debt * Funds) of the variable debt with the really executed 
project co-financed by the Structural Funds to capture the effects of the region’s level of indebtment in the 
effectiveness on income growth.
To them, we add in both models the following control variables: kh the human capital; ip the rate of public in-
vestment over the regions GDP; Employ, the working population rate of the region; the sum of n (population 
growth), g and δ, where g is the technological progress and δ the capital depreciation rate; agr, rate of the agri-
cultural production in the region’s GDP.
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TABLE 6
Estimation of the model with the artificial variable crisis included
Independent variable: ln(growth GDP pc)
 Coefficient t Coefficient t
GDP pc -0.175 -3.82 -0.167 -3.76
ERDF 0.002 0.50 0.002 0.97
ERDF -0.0003 -0.17 -0.002 -1.13
Crisis* ERDF  -0.004 -2.09
Crisis*program  -0.003 -0.83
Program 0.005 1.44 0.005 1.34 
Kh 0.021 3.50 0.021 3.61
Ip -0.001 -0.09 0.005 0.49
Employment 0.028 0.82 0.022 0.66
n + g + δ -0.038 -2.88 -0.038 -2.85
Agr -0.010 -1.61 -0.007 -1.15
Crisis -0.048 -11.44 -0.028 -2.56
Constant 1.845 3.27 5.475 3.27
R2 within 0.72 0.72
F 41.39 45.70
N.º observations 237 237
N.º groups 17 17
Average observations 13.9 13.9
Source: Own elaboration.
Note 6: The income per capita growth, GDP pc, is explained as a function of the executed investment’s projects 
co-financed by the European Rural Development Fund, ERDF and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development, EAFRD.
The first model estimates are shown for the in columns 2 and 3. The control variables following: Program, the 
planned investment in the budget; kh the human capital; ip the rate of public investment over the GDP; employ, 
the working population rate of the region; rate of the agricultural production in the region’s GDP; crisis dummy 
variable with zeros before 2007 year and ones after; To them, we add the sum of n (population growth), g and δ, 
where g is the technological progress and δ the capital depreciation rate.
The income per capita growth, GDP pc, is explained as a function of the executed investment’s projects co-
financed by the European Rural Development Fund, ERDF and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development, EAFRD.
In the second model (columns 4 and 5), with similar specification, we include the interactions of the variable 
crisis with the really executed project co-financed by the ERDF (crisis * ERDF) and, also, the interaction of cri-
sis * EAFRD to capture the effects of the change of business cycle in the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development realized projects.

